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INTRODUCTION

"I had always a most earnestdesire to know how to distinguish the true from the false, in orderthat I might be able
clearly to discriminate the rightpath in life, and proceed in
it with confidence. "l

The torture debate has long been the subject of a comprehensive body
of scholarly writing. The defeat of the Nazi regime during World War II,
the establishment of the United Nations, including the U.N. Charter, the
conclusion of international treaties on the protection of human rights (especially the right of human dignity), and the establishment of a general prohibition against torture and other forms of inhuman treatment, have led the
international community to believe-albeit with a degree of naivety-that
evil does not exist among us anymore. However, it seems that the tragedy
of 9/11, including the War on Terrorism declared by the Bush administration, 2 has awakened the international community to a new-old era, thus
making the implicit explicit and the unclear obvious. In this new-old era,
the international community has come to realize that like "terrorism," "torture" still exists among us, and that which was considered a triumph for
human rights following the conclusion of the Convention Against Torture,
was merely a symbolic achievement.
What is unique about the torture debate in the post-9/11 era is the vulnerability of the absolute taboo against the prohibition of torture. The declared War on Terrorism generated a particular correlation between terrorism and torture. Namely, the unprecedented intensification of terrorist activity in the past century has increased the chorus of voices in favor of torturing those suspected of terrorist activity. For these voices, torture is not
perceived to be as evil as terrorism, or at least is not perceived to be equivalent in nature to that of terrorism. The reason, as argued, is that the legitimate purpose underscoring the torture of terrorists-namely, saving the
lives of innocent people-negates the arguable evil otherwise embodied in
torture conduct. To a certain degree, this has also been the incentive for
those who recently have been advocating for a new regime of "judicial torture warrant[s]. '3 What underlies these voices is the speculative belief that
1.

RENt DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD 9 (Ernest Rhys ed., John Veitch

2.

THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

3.

See, e.g., ALAN M.

trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1912) (1637).
OF AMERICA

5 (2002), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

DERSHOWfTZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING
THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 156-63 (2002).
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torture prevents and eradicates terrorism. Such a belief rests arguably on the
view that we know terrorism when we see it.4 However, as correctly stated
by Immanuel Kant, "[t]o produce a history entirely from speculations alone
seems no better than to sketch a romance. Thus it could not go by the name
of speculative history but rather only that of fiction.' 5
If we are genuinely committed to establishing a well-organized international community, it should be clear that we cannot be driven by speculative beliefs. It should also be emphasized that what distinguishes enlightened and organized societies from barbarian ones is the reliance of the former on principles of respect for human dignity, including other maxims of
justice, reason, and proportionality. In an organized society, not all means
justify even the loftiest ends. Efficiency is one thing, but legality is another.
An organized society demonstrates that which is legal and stable. In an organized society, no single governmental branch stands above the
Law; they
6
all act in accordance with what the Law demands and compels.
It is the aim of this article to break up the dogmas and outmoded paradigms of torture, to affirm the right dogmas through the method of skepticism, and to criticize and correct the wrong dogmas through the method of
reasoning. In so aspiring, I am well aware of the difficulty entailed in an
attempt to draft an article on the entire torture debate. Realistically speaking, in the course of contemplating and organizing my thoughts and arguments, the task seemed quite impossible to me. However, with methodology and reason, I became more optimistic, and the mission came to seem
feasible. Accordingly, I have decided to analyze the basic premises of the
torture debate by addressing the following issues: (1) defining torture; (2)
punishing torturers; (3) justifying, excusing, or pardoning torturers; and (4)
conducting legal interrogation. I strongly believe that discussing these four
issues will enhance future study of the torture debate, whether or not one
agrees with my arguments and suggestions. In the course of formulating my
arguments, I am driven by my intuition that it is the duty of all scholars to
draw a theory regardless of the event, but never to articulate a theory in
4.
5.

See discussion infra Part II.

IMMANUEL KANT, Speculative Beginning of Human History, in PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICs, HISTORY, AND MORALS 49, 49 (Ted Humphrey

trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1983) (1795) (emphasis added).
6.
See MOHAMMED SAIF-ALDEN WATrAD, THE

MEANING OF CRIMINAL LAW:
THREE TENETS ON AMERICAN & COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SUBSTANTIVE

CRIMINAL LAW 44 (2008) (explaining that the term "law" refers to the laws enacted by legis-

lative bodies [i.e. statutes, constitutions, and treaties] and is to be distinguished from the
term "Law," which refers to the higher concept of the "good and just law" binding on all
human beings [i.e. the moral or religious law]; if the "law" contradicts the "Law," the latter
must prevail).
7.
Id. at 202-04.
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light of the event. 8 Scholars are guardians of the principles of reason and
proportionality, and they are expected to be the ultimate guardians of objectivity.
In Part II, I open this article by outlining torture law de lege lata as reflected by several international and national statutory norms and cases. In
that part, I criticize existing law on the torture debate-especially the
enigma of defining what constitutes torture-for its lack of conceptuality
and coherency. I argue that the articulation of the existing definition of torture has been politically motivated and delineated into a form that suits
what the international community observes to be torture in modem life.
However, it is my view that such a definition is not compatible with the
history of torture practice, nor will it suit future torture practice, particularly
in view of the rapid development of technology.
I also argue in Part II that both international and national judicial tribunals have constantly failed to fulfill their capacities in the course of interpreting statutory norms, in adhering simply and superficially to a methodology of citing and reciting existing statutory text, and by ignoring the conceptual and theoretical grounds of the torture phenomenon. In addition, I
will show that in the course of developing their case law by adhering to an
ad hoc examination methodology, which could be a correct methodology if
implemented with reason and coherency, several international tribunals
have made contradictory decisions about the meaning of torture.
Then, in Part III, I examine several leading legal essays on the definition of torture, thereby lending support to the criticism in Part II. These
essays support my criticism suggested in Part H and elaborate on the possible conceptual understanding of the torture phenomenon.
In Part IV, I offer my conceptual understanding of the torture phenomenon as premised on five conceptual distinctions that characterize the
torture situation: (1) superior versus inferior, (2) active versus passive, (3)
theatricality versus secrecy, (4) fear versus security, and (5) pleasure versus
suffering. Part IV analyzes the torture phenomenon in the abstract, out of
context.
In Part V, I discuss the role that "torture" plays in the jurisprudence of
crime and punishment. In that part, I criticize the haste in creating new
crimes for every phenomenon that we dislike and disdain without paying
any attention to fundamental principles of criminal law theory. I primarily
criticize courts for their explicit ignorance of the conceptual distinction
between constitutive elements of criminal guilt and other aggravating factors for sentencing. Such distinction is of the utmost importance in every
8.
Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Resurrecting "Romantics at War": International Self-Defense in the Shadow of the Law of War-Where are the Borders?, 13 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 205, 220 (2006).
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criminal trial, especially in common law systems where the criminal trial
consists of two clearly distinctive phases: the determination of culpability
stage and the sentencing stage.
Finally, in Part VI, I target five taboos that recur in the torture debate,
aiming, thereby, to refute or uphold them. These are: (1) the illusive nature
of the ticking-bomb enigma, (2) the unjustifiable grounds of the prohibition
against torture, (3) the inexcusable torturers, (4) compassion toward torturers, and (5) the administrative aspects of a reasonable interrogation.
Hereon, I only hope that this article can play the part of attracting jade
by laying bricks.
II.

DEFINING THE INDEFINABLE: BETWEEN THE MIND AND THE
HEART

It has been largely believed that one can know "terrorism" when one
sees it.9 Opposing this view, I once argued that "there are concepts that we
do not see, and even if we do, we cannot be sure what they are. Among
these concepts we count not only terrorism, but also war and democracy.'
What I had in mind in contending so was the rationale that there are phenomena that appeal to the heart before they are captured by the mindthese are phenomena that appeal to the feelings.
This classification is of the utmost importance in our inquiry into potentially adequate definitions of phenomena such as terrorism, torture, war,
and democracy. This is true in general, but truer in particular, in the realm
of criminal liability where it is required that the definition of a crime not be
vague, but rather be narrowly tailored in order to satisfy the constitutional
requirement that all criminal prohibitions provide fair notice to persons
before making their conduct criminal. 1

9.

Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I

shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.
But I know it when I see it ....). Although the court in Jacobellis is referring to pornography, arguably, terrorism is another act that is difficult to define, but which people recognize
when they see it.
10.
Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Is Terrorisma Crime or an Aggravating Factor
in Sentencing?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1017, 1030 (2006).
11.
See Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The Meaning of Guilt: Rethinking Apprendi, 33 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 501, 506 (2007); see also Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972);
Power v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1055, at 1070-71 (6th ed. 2000); Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The
Meaning of Wrongdoing: A Crime of Disrespecting the Flag: Grounds for Preserving 'National Unity'?, 10 SAN DIEGo INT'L L.J. pt. IV(C) (forthcoming 2008).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

A phenomenon that appeals to the feelings is intangible and amorphous in nature. Taken as it is, out of context, a conceptual definition,
which outlines the bold features of such a phenomenon, satisfies the aforementioned constitutional requirement. In contrast, a phenomenon that appeals to the mind is more tangible, visible, and definable. For this kind of
phenomenon, a conceptual definition is only the end of the beginning in our
journey towards formulating a clear and particular constitutional definition.
Terrorism, for example, appeals to the feelings, but not to the mind.
The tragic events of 9/11 and the bombings in London and Madrid serve as
good examples in this regard. At first blush, it was not immediately clear
after the attacks whether they were terrorist attacks or criminal actions. The
bombings in London and Madrid could have been a Mafia criminal commission or even a regular criminal commission, such as the almost regular
occurrence of violence in American schools where one fine morning a teenager decides to open fire on other pupils.
As for the 9/11 attacks, it was not until Osama bin Laden expressed his
pride in the success of the attacks committed by members of his organization, al-Qaeda, on TV that we understood that America was under terrorist
attack. Until then, one could have thought of many possible scenarios to
explain the events; for example, a technical problem in the jets' engines
could have been the reason for the enormous collisions with the Twin Towers.
The idea is that although people witnessed the tragedy, they were not
able to tell for sure if they were witnessing criminal conduct or acts of terror.' 2 The kind of terror and fright that terrorism generates was not felt until
the moment the American nation realized that Osama bin Laden was behind
the scenes operating the attacks. Only then was an extreme fear distributed
among the American nation.
Terrorism, therefore, illustrates the kind of phenomenon that we recognize once we feel it. It has been my view that such a phenomenon deserves to be conceptually defined, thereby criticizing all existing definitions
as being politically motivated. 13 A conceptual understanding of "terrorism"
would suggest inquiring not only into what we see today as terrorism, or
what previous generations have perceived as terrorism, but rather endeavoring to define the phenomenon of terrorism out of context.' 4 My call has
been to arrive at a conceptual
definition, the fundamental meaning of what
5
terrorism stands for.'
12.
13.
14.
15.
note 10, at

Wattad, supra note 10, at 1029.
Wattad, supra note 10, at 1025.
Wattad, supra note 10, at 1021.
I define "terroism" as "imposing fear on the nation as such." Wattad, supra
1022.
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The case for torture is not much different. The American declared War
on Terror has given rise to an intense discussion of alleged torture practice
at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. Among examples of such practices
were the photos released from Abu Ghraib showing a number of American
military personnel taunting naked prisoners who were forced to assume
humiliating poses. 16 One may plausibly argue that those who saw the pictures, directly or through the media, could tell for sure that the acts committed against the prisoners constitute torture, regardless of any previous
knowledge of the legal definition of torture.
I am skeptical though, whether this is realistically possible in the first
place, In my view, it is only when the context is clear that it is possible for a
person to tell whether or not torture is taking place. This is also the case for
the Abu Ghraib example. To elaborate on my view, I will refer to two further critical examples. One example is that which concerns the notorious
Nazi regime and the outrageous pictures of naked Jewish people walking
towards their deaths at the highly condemned Nazi concentration and eradication camps. The other example concerns the work of the famous American artist Spencer Tunick, who has been well known for his photos showing
installations that feature hundreds, if not thousands, of nude people posed in
artistic formations.
Here we have three pictures: Abu Ghraib, Nazi concentration camps,
and Tunick's artistic work. While the photos from Abu Ghraib and the Nazi
concentration camps can be easily classified as a living testimony of torture
activity, this is not the case for Tunick's installations. Tunick's work has
never been understood as involving torture. At worst, Tunick was arrested
several times only because of his activity outdoors, and even then the
charges against him were quickly dropped. Descriptively speaking, some of
Tunick's photos show naked people lying on top of one another, thus composing an installation of a small human hill. How are these photos different
from the Abu Ghraib pictures? They are different only if we understand the
context within which the pictures were taken.
It is significantly important to outline that while it is possible that Tunick's work is highly and stiffly criticized, it is not the same kind of criticism that we convey toward torture activity. To this extent, the context matters. Therefore, not every picture that alludes to torture-like activity is in
fact about torture.
Here we are then, like "terrorism," "torture" appeals to the feelings
and, therefore, it must be conceptually defined in the abstract and out of
context. The same photos from Abu Ghraib could have been pictures of a
father holding his five little children naked as a matter of punishment. The
16.
See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib:American Soldiers Brutalized
Iraqis. How Far Up Does the Responsibility Go?, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

father would definitely be prosecuted (e.g., for assault) and would very
likely be found guilty, but no one would consider torture a crime in this
context. At most, inhuman treatment or punishment could be taken into
account under article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950.17
What are the conceptual grounds then for torture? Before coping with
this question it is first worth getting a grip on existing definitions of torture,
as provided primarily by international documents.
A.

A HAZY DEFINITION

The prohibition against torture has been the subject of several international and national documents-among them, article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948;18 the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949; 19 article 3 of the European Convention; 20 article 7 of the International Covenant of Political and Civil
Rights of 1966;21 article 5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights
17.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950 amend. Nov. 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter
European Convention]. Article 3 of the European Convention speaks of "torture or inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. Compare article 3 of the Convention with A. v.
United Kingdom, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2694 (1998). It is not clear from the decision whether the
court was referring to the prohibition against torture, or rather to the prohibition against
degrading punishment. A. v. United Kingdom, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2694 (1998). It is my impression that the court was concerned with the latter prohibition. See id. para. 13.
18.
"No one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 3, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
19.
"[T]he following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever with respect ... : violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture .... " Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3.1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any
kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Id. art. 17. "Collective punishment for individual acts, corporal punishment, imprisonment in
premises without daylight and, in general, any form of torture or cruelty, are forbidden." Id.
art. 87. "Grave breaches ... shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed
against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including .... "Id. art. 130.
20.
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
21.
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
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of 1969;22 the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment of 1975 ;23 article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981 ;24 article 1(1) of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984;25
and article 55(1)(b) of the Rome Statute of 1998.26
All of these documents simply provide a general absolute prohibition
against torture. However, a definition of "torture" was provided only in
three places. Article 1(1) of the Convention Against Torture provides that:
For the purposes of this Convention, "torture" means any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include

medical or scientific experimentation." International Convention of Civil and Political
Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, S. ExEc. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
22.
"No one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment." American Convention on Human Rights art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
23.
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX),
U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975) [hereinafter Declaration on Torture].
24.
"Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a
human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited." African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art.
5,June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
25.
or Punishment art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
26.
"In respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person... shall not be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 55(1)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome
Statute makes torture a crime against humanity (article 7(1)(f)), as well as a war crime (article 8(2)(a)(ii) and article 8(2)(c)(i)). Id. arts. 7(l)(f), 8(2)(a)(ii), 8(2)(c)(i).
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pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to lawful sanctions.27
This definition has been duplicated, almost word-for-word, from the definition provided by article 1(1) of the Declaration on Torture. 28 However, it is
worth noting that the latter brings into play an additional feature by providing that "[t]orture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 29 Thus, it seems that the
Declaration Against Torture seeks to distinguish between torture and other
forms of humiliation and abuse that do not amount to torture. But, as has
been noted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Delalic case, "this quantitative element is implicit in the requisite
level of severity of suffering. 30
The third definition of torture was provided by the Rome Statute,
which basically follows the path of the Convention Against Torture. Yet,
the statute adds several elements that adapt the definition to the context
31
with which the statute is most concerned, namely, criminal prosecution.

27.
28.

Convention Against Torture, supra note 25, art. 1(1).
The Declaration on Torture states:
For the purpose of this Declaration, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other persons. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners.
Declaration on Torture, supra note 23, art. 1(1).
29. Declaration on Torture, supra note 23, art. 1(2).
30. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 457 (Nov. 16,
1998).
This differs from the formulation utilized in the Declaration on Torture
in two ways. First, there is no reference to torture as an aggravated form
of ill-treatment in the Torture Convention.... Secondly, the examples of
prohibited purposes in the Torture Convention explicitly include "any
reason based on discrimination of any kind," whereas this is not the case
in the Declaration on Torture.
Id.
31.
"'Torture' means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except
that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to,
lawful sanctions." Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 7(2)(e) (emphasis added). Regarding
torture as a crime against humanity, under the Rome Statute, it must be proved that the torture was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, and that the torturer had knowledge of the attack. See Bernard F. Hamilton, New
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Perceiving article 1(1) of the Convention Against Torture as the most
prominent, dominant, and universal provision in this context, I will now
cast the discussion mainly around it. As it stands today, the definition provided by the Convention Against Torture32 supplies more questions than
answers.
Examining the Convention's definition, most scholars of international
criminal law jurisprudence adhere to a methodology that sheds light solely
on its substantive characteristics. Antonio Cassese,33 for instance, draws a
line between the objective elements of the definition and its other subjective
elements. Another example would be Daniel Rothenberg, who offers four
distinctive components of the definition: actions, perpetrators, victims, and
objectives. 34 However, less focus has been placed on a more disputed matter regarding torture-the substantive nature of the phenomenon of torture
rather than its substantive structure.
The Convention's definition embraces two kinds of nature. On the one
hand, the Convention's definition is very limited in nature. It constrains its
applicability in several ways: (1) torture cannot be committed by omission
since the definition speaks only of an "act"; 35 (2) the torturer must be a public officer, or acting in a official capacity; (3) the victim of the torture activity must be a person, a human being; 36 (4) for torture to be considered in the
first place, it must be the case that the torturer had the intention37 to inflict
severe suffering (physical or mental); (5) the mentioned "intention" not
only addresses the torture's harm, but also is concerned with the purposes
for which the torture's harm is caused; and (6) at first blush, the purposes
for which "torture" can be considered are limited in nature, although the
provided list for these purposes is not an exclusive one; 38 however, it seems
that the purposes are limited to circumstances that take place only at the
time of the interrogation.
Court Offers New Torture Definition and New Hope for Victims, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &

POL'Y 111, 112 (1999).
32.
Hereinafter "Convention's definition."
33.
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 446-47 (2d ed. 2005); ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 119-20 (2003); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic,
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 455-74 (Nov. 16, 1998).
34.
Daniel Rothenberg, "What We Have Seen Has Been Terrible": Public Presentational Torture and the Communicative Logic of State Terror,67 ALB. L. REV. 465, 473-76

(2003).
35.

Most criminal codes in the world provide that "act" is defined as an "act or

omission." See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 68 (1998)

(recognizing, however, that unless the Convention Against Torture provides so, an
"omission" is not a form of an "act").
36.
Hereinafter "torture's harm."
37.
See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 446-47 (2d ed. 2005).
38.
The Convention's definition uses the terms "for such." Convention Against
Torture, supra note 25, art. 1(1).
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On the other hand, the Convention's definition offers some explicit
loopholes that allow one to think of the definition as open-ended. As already provided, the definition is not limited solely to the four purposes
listed within article 1(1);39 rather, these listed purposes constitute an illustrative charter of the kind of purposes with which the definition is most
concerned. The Convention's definition also extends to acts causing pain or
suffering (physical or mental) if intentionally inflicted for "any reason
based on discrimination of any kind. ' 4°
Ironically, whereas the Convention Against Torture holds the promise
of providing a clear definition for the "torture" phenomenon, a simple reading of the Convention's definition makes it clear that such an end has not
been achieved. To elaborate on this charge, the Convention does not tell,
for example, what "any reason based on discrimination of any kind '4 1
means. These are very vague terms; however, these are exactly the kinds of
terms that allow for future judicial development of the law. But, while future judicial development is always welcomed, thus keeping the law as
close as possible to the sentiments of the international community, it must
still be clear that such a definition stands in complete contrast to the longstanding solid constitutional pillar of criminal law theory, according to
which, there is no crime and no punishment without prior legislative warning, as expressed in the Latin maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege.42
In spite of this clear violation of one of the most fundamental principles of criminal law theory, judicial tribunals have made some "interpretive
use[s]" of this provision, thus holding, inter alia, that rape constitutes torture if all the other conditions required under the Convention's definition
are fulfilled.43 Was this solely a judicial interpretation of a statutory legal
norm, or rather, a wider "judicial legislation" of a new crime!? The question
seems to be rhetorical only.
Allow me now to voice my thoughts, queries, and contemplations on
the perplexing premises of the Convention's definition.
I. Why is torture by omission not possible under the explicit language of the Convention? Why is the definition limited only to
39.
The four listed purposes are: (1) obtaining information, (2) obtaining confessions, (3) punishing, and (4) intimidating or coercing. Convention Against Torture, supra
note 25, art. 1(1).
40.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 25, art. 1(1).
41.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 25, art. 1(1).
42.
See Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The Meaning of Guilt: Rethinking Apprendi, 33 NEw ENG.J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 501, 510 n.41 (2007).
43.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has
recognized that rape, if the other conditions of the Convention's definition are met, constitutes torture. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 496 (Nov. 16,
1998); see also Aydin v. Turkey, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 86 (1997).
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"acts"? Should there not be a duty for an official to take reasonable measures and thereby seize the commission of torture, once
such a commission comes to his attention!?
II. Why can only public officers or others acting in an official capacity be regarded as torturers!? Why can private actors not be condemned for torture? Why is "state action" such a requirement
here!? 44

III. Why is the Convention's definition limited only to "severe" pain
or suffering!? How can this severity ever be measured!? Is it not
true that one person's pain is another person's severe pain, and
vice versa?
IV. Why did the drafters of the Convention find it compelling to provide an illustrative list of purposes with which torture is most concerned? Was the definition articulated by them not clear and detailed enough?
Later on, these mysteries will elaborate on my understanding of the
conceptual definition of "torture." However, at this stage, I would like to
express that which my intuition urges me to express. I already have the impression that the Convention's drafters have trapped themselves by articulating a definition that is hybrid in character. I strongly believe that such
puzzlement is due to the fact that in doing their work, their minds were captured by certain historical practices of torture, as well as by certain political
incentives and motivations.45
B.

JUDICIAL FANCY FUZZY TERMINOLOGY: THE FAILURE TO EXPLORE THE
MEANING OF TORTURE

In the wake of enforcing the general prohibition against torture, several legal tribunals, both international and national, were faced with the
definition question. As we shall shortly learn, no single tribunal has ever
given any kind of substantive elaboration on the Convention's definition.
Rather, they have sought to clarify what has already been said on torture.
Henceforth, I will consider the leading cases in this regard.
The Ireland case, decided by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR), demonstrates well the judicial reluctance to exceed the outmoded
dogmas of the existing definition of torture.4 6 As I shall shortly explain,
See generally Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The International Law of
44.
Torture: From Universal Proscriptionto Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARv.
HuM. RTs. J. 87, 113 (2001).

By this accusation, I only mean that they were trying to articulate a definition
45.
that can be adopted by as many countries as possible, thus achieving at least the general
condemnation embodied in the Convention.
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
46.
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neither in the Ireland case, nor in any other case, have judicial tribunals
asked the fundamental and basic question of "what constitutes torture?"
Rather, they have adhered to a simple and superficial reading of the relevant text of the Convention Against Torture.
The Ireland case 47 involved the practice of the so-called "five techniques" in the course of interrogating those who were suspected of acts of
terror. The question at stake concerned whether these techniques constituted
torture in violation of article 3 of the European Convention. The "five techniques" include: (1) wall standing in a stress position, (2) hooding, (3) subjection to noise, (4) deprivation of sleep, and (5) deprivation of food and
drink.48
Obviously, the European Convention does not include any definition
of the concept of "torture," but rather a general prohibition against torture.
This case, therefore, called the ECHR to consider the possible meaning of
"torture." However, the ECHR avoided doing so. Instead, it laid out general
themes on ill-treatment, holding that ill-treatment "must attain a minimum
level of severity, '49 which shall be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the circumstances of each case. In the wake of such an ad hoc
examination, considerations like "the duration of the treatment, its physical
or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the
victim, etc." 50 shall be taken into account.
The ECHR held that the five techniques "were applied in combination,
with premeditation and for hours at a stretch; they caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least intense physical and mental suffering ... and also led to
acute psychiatric disturbances during interrogation.",5' However, the ECHR
ironically concluded that they did not constitute acts of torture, but rather
inhuman and degrading treatment for they "did not occasion suffering of
the particular
intensity and cruelty implied by the word 'torture' as so un52
derstood.
The ECHR did not even explain what kind of suffering amounts to torture. With benign words on the general prohibition against torture, absent
even minimal substance, the ECHR simply borrowed the distinction between torture and other inhuman treatment from article 1(2) of the Declaration on Torture, which provides that torture is distinguishable from other

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. para. 96.
Id. para. 96(a)-(e).
Id. para. 162.
Id.
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 167 (1978).
Id.
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forms of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" based on
the aggravation and deliberateness of the commission.53
Bearing in mind this decision, one might have the impression that the
court acts randomly in deciding between what constitutes torture and what
counts as causing less severe pain than that which is required for torture. It
is clear that something is missing in the court's treatment of the definition
of torture, and that something is seriously superficial in the court's understanding of the depth of the legal problem. Further cases before the ECHR
support my inquiries, and I shall now address some of them.
Before doing so, I must note that the following cases prove that the
ECHR has been treating the torture dilemma in a very superficial manner,
not only reciting what has been superficially developed in the Ireland
case, 54 but also referring to the simple words of the Convention Against
Torture, instead of further developing the theory underlying the Convention's definition. This deserves criticism.
Does "birching ' 5 5 constitute a violation of the European Convention's
prohibition on torture, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment?
This was the question before the ECHR in the Tyrer case.5 6 This case involved the birching of a fifteen-year-old student for assaulting his classmate.5 7 The birching included removal of his trousers and underwear.5 8 In
rejecting the contention of torture, the ECHR found it enough to refer to the
distinction articulated in the Ireland case, as well as to the Convention
Against Torture, without providing any further explanation as to what level
of severity amounts to torture. 59 For the court, it seemed the Ireland case
was a self-evident precedent even though the Ireland case did not tell us
much; rather, the Ireland case merely provided citations to some paragraphs
from the Convention Against Torture and the Declaration on Torture. To
that extent, the court failed again to explore the grounds of the definition of
"torture."9
However, it was the ECHR in this case that decided to develop another
distinction, this time between "inhuman punishment" and "degrading pun53.
Id. (quoting Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
3452 (XXX), art. 1(2), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9,
1975)).
54.
Ireland,25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).
55.
"Birching" refers to the fact that the branches of the birch tree were formerly
used for beating people as a punishment. See A.S. HORNBY, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER'S
DICTIONARY OF CuRRENT ENGLISH 108 (Jonathan Crowther & A.S. Homby eds., 5th ed.
1995).
56.
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
57.
Id. para. 9.
58.
Id. para. 10.
59.
Id. para. 29.
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ishment." One may ask what the conceptual grounds for this distinction are.
The ECHR provides no answer except that which reminds us of the court's
methodology of citing simple extracts, holding that "Article 3, by expressly
prohibiting 'inhuman' and 'degrading' punishment, implies that there is a
distinction between such punishment and punishment in general. ' 6 ° In concluding that the acts discussed in this case constitute degrading punishment,
the court further "explained" that for punishment to be degrading, it must
involve a particular degree of humiliation or debasement. 6 1 Such assessment must be done on an ad hoc basis, depending on the particular circumstances of each case. 62 Here again, as in the Ireland case, the court adhered
to vague terminology, as well as created new distinctions, yet no explanation of the substance of these distinctions was provided.6 3
However, I should still make it clear that I am not suggesting that the
court should have delineated a long list of particular acts that constitute
degrading and inhuman punishment or torture. Rather, the court is expected
to further explain that which, from the court's perspective, establishes the
"particular level" to which the court constantly refers. The court must provide at least certain general outlines. In the absence of these outlines, or
conceptual outlines, the puzzle can never be resolved. 64
To support my criticism, let me now consider the Aksoy case of the
ECHR, 65 which involved acts of stripping the interrogatee "naked, with his
66
arms tied together behind his back, and suspend[ing him] by his arms."
Unlike the Ireland case, the ECHR concluded here that the acts committed
against the interrogatee amounted to torture. 67 Notably, the court even adhered to the precedent as "developed" by the Ireland case regarding the
distinction between "torture" and "other forms of inhuman treatment," but
still reached a different conclusion than that which the Ireland case borrowed from the Declaration on Torture. Such a result leads to some serious
conclusions: first, that the circumstances involved in the Ireland case were
not as cruel as the circumstances described in the Aksoy case; and second,
that the ECHR failed to explain in the Aksoy case what makes the Palestin60.
Id. para. 30.
61.
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 30 (1978).
62.
Id.
63.
See Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A); see also Aydin v. Turkey, 50 Eur. Ct.
H.R. para. 86 (1997).
64.
See generally Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)
(declining to decide whether putting someone on death row constitutes torture in and of
itself).
65.
Aksoy v. Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (1996).
66.
Id. paras. 23, 64 (describing the position of the prisoner). Hereinafter, this incident will be referred to as the "Palestinian hanging."
67.
Id. para. 64.
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torture in light of the "five techniques" discussed in
ian hanging constitute
68
case!
the Ireland
However, such a failure to explore the conceptual definition of torture
has not been the sole domain of the European community. The Supreme
Court of Israel (SCI) was also faced with similar circumstances to those at
issue in the Ireland case. 69 The SCI had to decide whether acts practiced by
the General Security Service (GSS) interrogators against those suspected of
terrorist activity, such as shaking the suspect and placing him in stressful
positions, fell within the limits of reasonable interrogation.7 °
Chief Justice Aharon Barak, who wrote the opinion for the court,
adopted a genuine legal methodology, thus avoiding the inquiry into the
definition of "torture." Justice Barak did not even refer to the Convention
Against Torture. Instead, he stated that the case before him called for an
examination of the merit of the institution of "reasonable interrogation,"
noting that, "a reasonable investigation is necessarily one free of torture,
free of cruel, inhuman treatment, and free of any degrading conduct whatsoever. ' 7 ' But, what constitutes torture, cruel, inhuman treatment, and de72
grading conduct? This question was simply neglected.
In support of my impression that the SCI was reluctant to address the
issue of defining torture, it is worth highlighting Justice Barak's own
words: "Indeed, violence directed at a suspect's body or spirit does not constitute a reasonable investigation practice., 73 With these words, Justice Barak leaves the reader puzzled, for one now knows what this kind of practice
does not constitute-namely, reasonable interrogation-but not what it
does constitute.
Again, the ECHR and the SCI are not alone in this long-term "timidity" to engage in a serious conceptual discussion of the meaning of torture.
Several cases of international tribunals on personal criminal liability support this conclusion. If up until this point I have been speaking about the
puzzle of the definition of torture, then the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), for example, has muddied the water
further, thereby making the puzzle more complicated. The Delalic case74
See Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); Ribitsch v. Austria, 336
68.
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996) (elaborating on the absence of a clear theory regarding the
meaning of "torture"); Tomasi v. France, 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel
69.
[1999] IsrSC 54(4) 817 [hereinafter Israeli Case Against Torture].
70.
Id.
71.
Id. para. 23.
It is plausible only to believe that Justice Barak intentionally avoided the prob72.
lematic grounds of defining "torture."
See Israeli Case Against Torture, supra note 69.
73.
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 468 (Nov. 16,
74.
1998); see also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Judgment, (Feb.
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has been the leading case in this regard. In that case, the ICTY held clearly
that "mistreatment that does not rise to the threshold level of severity necessary to be characterized as torture may constitute another offence, ' 75 adding
that inhuman treatment is the kind of action that "deliberately causes serious mental or physical suffering that falls short of the
severe mental and
76
physical suffering required for the offence of torture.,
Interestingly, while holding so, the court noted that no abstract threshold of pain or suffering could be determined. 77 In addition, it is worth mentioning that the court emphasized that both acts and omissions may constitute torture so long as the torturer demonstrates the required intent. 78 On
this last point, one may raise an eyebrow, for it is not clear how "torture by
omission" has come to exist; the court did not explain this position.79
To conclude on this point, in my view, it is wrong as well as dangerous to believe that the existing definition of torture does not require further
elaboration by judicial review. Any text that provides a definition is not
self-evident, but rather requires interpretation and elaboration; this is for
judges to do. However, such development may not involve creating crimes
that are not clearly included in the text. In addition, such judicial developments suggest to domestic and international legislatures how to address the
conceptual grounds of the phenomenon of torture. In the absence of this
sort of judicial activity, instances such 8as
the notorious American torture
0
memos should come as no surprise to us.
Section 2340 of title 18 of the United States Code 81 defines torture as
an "act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than
pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within
his custody or physical control. 82 On its face, the American definition has
the same substance and components as the Convention's definition. 83 However, as I have already asserted, any kind of legislation requires interpretation; the mere existence of a legal norm does not ultimately give it sub22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 593-94 (Sept. 2,
1998); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, (Dec. 10, 1988).
75.
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 542 (Nov. 16,
1998).
76. Id.
77.
Id. para. 544.
78.
See id. paras. 468, 543.
79. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 468 (Nov. 16,
1998).
80.
See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudencefor the White
House, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1681 (2005).
81.
See id. at 1707.
18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) [hereinafter American definition].
82.
83.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 25, art. 1(1).
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stance. As for the Convention's definition, I have contended so far that legal tribunals have failed to launch an inquiry into the meaning of the Convention's definition. In the American context, the story is slightly different.
Following the American-declared War on Terror, the Bush administration
asked the U.S. Department of Justice to submit memos on, inter alia, the
standards of conduct under the Convention Against Torture, as implemented by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.84
In the Gonzales memo, for example, it was provided that the kind of
torture that the United States Code proscribes includes only,
acts inflicting, and that are specifically intended to inflict,
severe pain or suffering, whether mental or physical. Those
acts must be of an extreme nature to rise to the level of torture within the meaning of Section 2340A and [The Convention Against Torture]

....

[C]ertain acts may be cruel,

inhuman, or degrading, but still do not produce pain and
suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section
2340A's proscription against torture.85
Now, one may certainly oppose the Gonzales memo's understanding of the
meaning of torture. However, as regards the Gonzales memo, in the absence
of substantive interpretation by international tribunals, it is only plausible to
expect that other domestic authorities will feel free to articulate their own
understanding of the prohibition on torture in a way that serves their own
interests.
Having said that, I shall express my own wonder and disdain, upon
reading the Gonzales memo, for it undermines the basic pillars upon which
the general prohibition against torture stands. According to the Gonzales
memo, "specific intent" cannot be established if the actor acts "knowing
that severe pain or suffering was reasonably likely to result from his actions, but no more. 86 In addition, the memo limits the degree of pain and
severity to the most possible extreme, thus including within the meaning of
torture only "death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions.",87 The memo further considers only "prolonged mental harm" to rise
to the level of severe mental pain or suffering.8 8
84.
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS 172, 172 (Karen J.
available at
http://
Joshua
L.
Dratel
eds.,
2005),
Greenberg
&
news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80lO2mem.pdf [hereinafter Gonzales memo].
85.
Id. at 172.
86. Id. at 174.
87. Id. at 176.
88. Id. at 177.
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The Gonzales memo is the kind of danger that I have in mind by criticizing the reluctance of, particularly, international legal tribunals to cross
the outmoded dogmas and engage in the substantive conceptual meaning of
the phenomenon of "torture."
The question remains then: What constitutes torture? This shall not be
an inquiry into the existing Convention's definition, but rather a journey
into the conceptual and purposive grounds of the phenomenon of torture. I
shall now consider the leading scholarly perspectives on the conceptual
meaning of torture.

III.

BETWEEN CLARIFICATION AND CRITICISM

Jeremy Waldron has recently correctly expressed the view that the
Convention Against Torture does not really suggest any definition on the
concept of "torture," rather, that it supplies only a general prohibition
against torture. 89 It is his opinion that underlying the Convention's definition is the theory that we know torture when we see it. 90 Among other
things, Waldron criticizes the so-called "puke" test. 91 He contends that there
are many things which, upon being witnessed, are very likely to make a
human being puke, but that, in and of itself, does not mean that all the
things witnessed constitute torture. What lies between the lines of Waldron's well-articulated essay is the call for an urgent formulation of a conceptual and structured definition of the torture phenomenon.
Like Waldron, David Sussman stiffly criticizes the Convention's definition, asserting that the Convention Against Torture "does not address the
central question of what counts as the infliction of [the] requisite sort of
suffering . . . ,or the broader context that might have to be in place to distinguish torture from other forms of coercion, manipulation, or intimidation. 93 To elaborate on his criticism, he provides that Donald Rumsfeld's
rejection of the international condemnation of what has been viewed as
torture practice in Abu Ghraib.94 In this context, Rumsfeld argued that
while the photos released from Abu Ghraib might reflect a practice of humiliation or a kind of abuse, they still do not show any act of torture.95
In order to fill in the conceptual vacuum in the Convention's definition, Sussman suggests that while the infliction of intense pain might be a
feature of torture, the main distinctive feature of torture is passivity of the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Waldron, supra note 80, at 1694.
Waldron, supra note 80, at 1695.
Waldron, supra note 80, at 1695 n.63.
Waldron, supra note 80, at 1695.
David Sussman, Defining Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 225 (2006).
See id. at 225.
Id.
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victim, namely, the "alienation of the victim from his own bodily and emotional life that force[s] passivity before pain and fear can engender."96 Perfectly described by Sussman, the victim of torture must be one that cannot
fight back; he is, rhetorically speaking, handcuffed.97 In his words, "the
torture victim realizes that he has no room to maneuver against his antagonist, no way to fight back or protect himself, and he must realize that his
antagonist operates an awareness of this as well. 9 8
A similar approach was adopted by David Luban, who asked the question: "What makes torture ... ?'99 Luban answers the question by putting
primary focus on the psychological aspects of the torture phenomenon. 1°°
He argues that one must understand the conceptual interaction between the
torturer and the victim in order to understand the conceptual meaning of
torture. As he puts it,
Torture aims to strip away from its victim all the qualities
of human dignity .

. .

. The torturer inflicts pain one-on-

one, deliberately, up close and personal, in order to break
the spirit of the victim-in other words, to tyrannize and
dominate the victim....
. . . [T]orture isolates and privatizes. Pain forcibly
severs our concentration on anything outside of us; it collapses our horizon to our own body and the damage we feel
in it ....
[I]t becomes impossible to pay attention to anything else. 101

While I may express certain sympathy with such an approach, Luban still
does not tell us "what makes torture," but rather only tells us "what torture
makes." Namely, he does not articulate a conceptual definition of the torture phenomenon, but rather delineates a conceptual scheme of the outcomes of the torture practice.
In his essay, What We Have Seen Has Been Terrible, Daniel Rothenberg puts the emphasis on another component of the torture phenomenon. 102
He argues that torture is not solely about the obvious harm that torture entails, but rather that it is about "the logic of power that motivates its prac-

96. Id. at 227.
97.
Id. at 229.
98.
Id. at 227.
99.
David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425,
1429 (2005).
100.
See id.
101.
Id. at 1430.
102.
Rothenberg, supra note 34, at 465.
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tice." 10 3 In my modest view, this is one of the key perceptions to capturing
the conceptual understanding of "torture."'"
IV.

CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF TORTURE

To understand the conceptual grounds of "torture," one must first distinguish between the core components of "torture," and the other components that loiter in the periphery. The core components solely concern the
phenomenon being examined. These components aim to describe the substance of the phenomenon. They target the situation, namely, the interaction
between the torturer and the victim. Unlike the core components, the peripheral components describe the constitutive elements of the phenomenon
not in abstract, but rather within a particular context. For example, peripheral components may suggest that for the purposes of criminal prosecution,
only torture that is committed by a state agent shall be criminally punished;
yet at the core-component level, all kinds of torture conduct are con10 5
demned, whether practiced by private actors or executed by state agents.
In this part, I am prepared to limit the discussion to the core components,
which, in my view, constitute the only required elements of the conceptual
understanding of "torture."
There is much in common between torture and terrorism to the extent I
dare contend that torture is a form of terror. I once stiffly criticized existing
definitions of terrorism. It has been my view that most international scholars seek to articulate a definition of terrorism in light of what they see
nowadays as terrorism.' 0 6 In addition, this kind of definition "has more a
political inspiration than a theoretical one."' 1 7 I strongly believe that this
has also been the case for "torture." The trouble is that such definitions
might not match acts of torture that were exercised throughout history, and
certainly cannot match future torture practice, especially in light of the
rapid development of modern, sophisticated interrogation techniques.
Understanding the conceptual premises of terrorism may elaborate on
our understanding of "torture" as it leads one to think of torture as a form of
terror, namely, as a form of imposing extreme fear on the victims of torture. 108 The question then concerns the motivation that stands behind this
kind of extreme fear. What is the kind of pain and suffering required in
order for us to be able to condemn a certain act as torture? And, what is

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Rothenberg, supra note 34, at 465.
Rothenberg, supra note 34, at 465.
See discussion infra Part V.
Wattad, supra note 10, at 1012.
Wattad, supra note 10, at 1025.
Wattad, supra note 10, at 1021, 1023.
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happening between the torturer and the victim that makes both of them understand that one is torturing and that the other is being tortured?
Speaking of torture on the conceptual level allows us to think of this
phenomenon outside of any particular context, and implies a situation of
interaction between the torturer and the victim. The characteristics of the
torturer and the victim lend themselves to five cumulative, conceptual distinctions: (1) superior versus inferior, (2) active versus passive, (3) theatricality versus secrecy, (4) fear versus security, and (5) pleasure versus suffering.'0 9
A.

SUPERIOR VERSUS INFERIOR

Torture as a conceptual phenomenon is available only in cases where a
degree of superiority between the torturer and the victim exists. This superiority is not a matter of an official rank or position that the torturer holds,
but rather an expression of the attitude that the torturer conveys toward the
victim. Such attitude embraces not only the message that the torturer is superior to the victim, but primarily that the victim is inferior to the torturerthe victim is merely an object controlled by the torturer. Such messages
may not be objectively perceived simply by reading or viewing the circumstances surrounding the torture experience, but rather must be clear from
the subjective interaction between the torturer and the victim. Such an attitude may exist in the relationship between a father and his son or daughter,
a husband and his wife (especially in third-world countries or Eastern societies where the man is viewed as superior and the woman is inferior), a judge
and a defendant in court, an investigator and a suspect, and a teacher and
his or her pupil. These are only a few examples where, under certain subjective circumstances, an attitude of superiority versus inferiority can be
observed.
It is true that, literally speaking, inferiority is the opposite of superiority. However, from a conceptual perspective, it is not always the case that
whenever somebody is superior to the other the latter is necessarily inferior
to the former. From a logical point of view, it is plausible to argue that superiority implies subordination, yet it does not necessarily imply inferiority.
In a criminal investigation, it is always the case that the interrogator is superior to the suspect and that the latter is subordinate to the investigator. This
is as well the case in the relationship between a father or mother and his or
her son or daughter, and between a husband and his wife (especially in
Eastern societies). However, one shall not imply inferiority simply based on
existing subordination.
109.
tions."

Hereinafter, these distinctions will be referred to as "the five conceptual distinc-
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It is my view that inferiority consists of further characteristics than
simply one being subordinate to another person. Inferiority is about humiliation; it is about a kind of constant fear that occupies the heart and the
mind of the inferior-a fear that is imposed, or that is caused, or that is controlled, or that can be ceased by the superior. This inferiority is about the
passive characteristics of the inferior against the active features of the superior; it is about his restricted power to react to acts and expressions of the
superior.
Such inferiority views the victim as an object;110 the victim is not
someone who acts, but something that is being acted upon,"' namely, as a
complete means for achieving certain ends. Such treatment constitutes humiliation for it infringes on the basic dignity with which all creatures were
born. 112 This is the kind of humiliation that causes dehumanization, thus
stripping the victim of the attribute of being a person in the first place. 113
B.

ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE

It is impossible to imagine a torture situation where both the torturer
and the victim are active actors. It must be the case that the victim is a passive participant. His passivity is expressed through his inability to react to
the torturer's provocations.14
A torture situation is characterized by the torturer's initiation. The torturer preempts the circumstances by which the whole situation is driven, the
victim has no control over these circumstances. He is merely a reactive
person.
Not only is the victim reactive, but his reactivity is also constrained to
a serious degree. It is not that the victim is willing to be static, but rather
that because of the situation imposed on him, he is coerced to be passive.
Like an animal that is struggling upon its slaughter, the victim of torture is
keen to release himself, to cease the torturer's power and domination over
him, to react to the torturer's provocations, and even to avenge. Yet, all of
these he simply cannot do. The torturer confines him, literally and metaphorically.
It is of course not always the case that the victim's hands are physically cuffed. Sometimes, it is the power, official position, and dominance of
the torturer that restrain the victim from reacting. It is not about the victim's
physical inability to react, but often it is his mental handicap that prevents
110.
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him from capturing the overriding motivation of the torturer. The victim is
simply "unable to shield herself in any significant way, and ...

unable to

effectively evade or fight back."1 5 This kind of passivity is what creates the
extreme fear and instability that surrounds16 the victim; it is exactly what
makes the victim vulnerable and impotent.'
THEATRICALITY VERSUS SECRECY

C.

George Fletcher once argued that, among other things, terrorism is
characterized by its theatrical aspect. It has been Fletcher's view that terrorism is meaningless if committed in secret. Underlying his argument is the
logic that terrorists are proud of their terrorist commissions, thus expressing
their guiltlessness.!i1
While the phenomena of torture and terrorism might share a core component concerning the imposition of extreme fear on their victims, it is still
the case that unlike terrorism, torture takes place in deep darkness. Torturers always invoke justifications for committing their wrongs; they do not
argue that torture is legitimate. At best, their argument is that their conduct
is needed to meet exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. Unlike terrorists, torturers not only feel guilty, but also seek to justify their wrongs; thus
negating them by invoking all possible criminal defenses. In addition, those
who are accused of practicing torture, unlike terrorists, feel shame about the
accusation against them. For them, the accusation of torture is no less than
the mark of Cain. Finally, unlike terrorists, torturers are not willing to admit
their arguable wrongs. They are keen to keep their practice in secret. They
are not proud of their actions, though they are very likely, in certain contexts, to be proud of the outcome of their torture practice, especially when
interrogators have succeeded in preventing a terrorist attack, although still
they are ashamed of the practice itself.1 8
Additionally, torture is more effective if committed in secret because
such deep darkness creates the atmosphere required to isolate the victimto terrorize, frighten, and overwhelm him. Among other factors, such mysvictim's spirit and promotes the torturer's dominance over
tery breaks the
9
the victim."
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This is the case when, because of torture practices, the victim confesses to a
118.
particular terror activity, for example, and the authorities are then able to take all possible
measures in order to prevent the terror attack in advance.
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FEAR VERSUS SECURITY

The word "terror" owes its etymology to Middle English: from the
Anglo-French word terrour;from the Latin word terrjre, which means "to
frighten" (the word terrjre is related to the Greek word trein, which means
120
"to be afraid"); and to the Latin word tremein, which means "to tremble."
Torture (torture in French, tortura in Spanish, and folterung in German)
generates "fear"; it is the same kind of fear with which terror is associated.
The phenomenon of torture stands at the distinctive point between fear and
security. It describes two characters: one who enjoys a high degree of security and confidence, and another who is subject to constant and overwhelming fear.
The torturer receives his power, confidence, and security from his
status,12 1 position, rank, or authority. This kind of confidence and security is
what grounds the torturer's absolute dominance and control over the victim.
Taken together, the security and the confinement are what grant the torturer
the power to treat the victim as a mere object, namely, to inflict upon him
whatever he wishes.
As for the victim, he is under the kind of fear that captures victims of
terrorism. All crimes generate fear, but terror and torture generate a different kind of fear. It is a constant and intensive fear that is not ceased simply
when the overwhelming circumstances do not take place anymore. This is
the kind of fear that definitely, and not speculatively, follows the victim
until his death, even after the circumstances of the torture practice stop existing. It is not merely about the tragedy and the nightmares that follow the
incident. Rather, it is about the instability that also captures the victim's
soul during the torture activity; it collapses his horizon into his own body
and soul, thus making it impossible for him to pay attention to anything else
but the intense and constant fear. 122 Usually, it is the case that the victim is
struggling not necessarily for his life, but primarily for his dignity, for his
existence as a creature, and for preserving the lowest level of human conditions. This distinction between security and fear illustrates the kind of
123
mercy that the victim begs for from the torturer.
E.

PLEASURE VERSUS SUFFERING

Torture is not possible if the victim is not suffering. International
documents put emphasis on a high degree of suffering; they even speak of
120.
121.
122.
123.
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physical or mental pain. 24 With this approach I do not agree. I understand
the international community's enthusiasm for adhering to such an approach,
thus emphasizing its strong condemnation of torture activity, as well as
expressing the idea that torture is a unique and rare phenomenon that does
not take place whenever suffering or pain takes place. However, condemnation is one thing and defining it is another. Besides that, I am not really sure
if torture is so rare, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. 125 The fact that we
did not speak of torture very often in the period between World War II and
9/11 is not evidence that torture was not among us. However, nowadays, in
the existence of media and modem technology, as well as the large number
of human rights organizations, the debate has become more active and imminent.
It is my view that suffering is a constitutive element of the conceptual
definition of torture. However, the degree of this kind of suffering does not
necessarily need to be so severe. The idea of "suffering" must be understood as combined with the other above mentioned four conceptual distinctions. That is, the fact that the victim is being intimidated by the torturer,
while at the same time he, the victim, is restrained and "handcuffed," and
thus cannot react, is in itself the kind of suffering that generates the sort of
fear with which torture is associated. This understanding of "suffering"
contributes to our perception of the notion of pain. Having said that, we do
not really need serious and severe pain in order to classify a certain activity
as torture.
As for the torturer, it is not necessary to confine the conceptual definition of torture solely to the circumstances where the torturer intends to elicit
information from the victim, where he intends simply to cause suffering to
him, or where he intends to impose pain on him. For the conceptual definition, the torturer's purposes are simply irrelevant. The only relevant elements are those that concern the situation, the victim, and the torturer's
general intention to torture the victim (namely, the intention of creating the
terrifying atmosphere as demonstrated by the five conceptual distinctions,
which is associated, in this context, with the commission of regular crimes
of violence against the person/body)-a state of mind that can also be satis126
fied if the torturer was aware of the natural consequences of his actions.
Once it is torture, it always shall be so perceived, regardless of the purposes
underpinning it.
124.
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Speaking of irrelevance, and to sum up, I would like to set out three
important points on the conceptual grounds of the phenomenon of torture,
and in doing so, primarily criticize, implicitly, the existing definitions of
torture. In my view, for the conceptual meaning of torture, (1) it is irrelevant who torturer is-he can be a private actor as well as a state agent; (2) it
is irrelevant what kind of pain or suffering is being inflicted on the victim,
nor is the degree of such pain or suffering inflicted relevant; and (3) the
torturer's purpose is simply irrelevant.
Taken together, the previously mentioned five conceptual distinctions
shall enable us now to form a broad understanding of the phenomenon of
torture.
V.

TORTURE IN CONTEXT: TORTURERS AS DANGEROUS CRIMINALS

I have already contended that for criminal purposes it is plausible that
domestic legislatures restrict the imposition of criminal liability only to, for
example, the infliction of severe pain or suffering, or to torture that is being
committed by state agents, as a matter of legislative policy or other domestic interests, thereby adapting the criminalization to the sentiments of the
community. But, the question first must be whether "torture" constitutes a
separate and independent crime!
Ariel Dorfman once observed that "torture is of course a crime committed against a body."'127 Johan Vyver has "confirmed" this view, adding
that, like terrorism, torture is a crime. 28 Isthis really true? Could it not be
the case that torture is nothing but the conventional violence of crimes
against the body (or the person) with which we are already familiar (e.g.,
murder, assault, rape, battery, mayhem, etc.)? If so, what role then do my
five suggested conceptual distinctions play in the course of convicting and
punishing torturers? These questions have great significance in criminal law
systems of the common law legacy.
Common law systems, in criminal cases, distinguish between proceedings that determine guilt or innocence and the sentencing stage. On the contrary, criminal cases in civil law systems consist of one single phase, combining both the guilt/innocence proceedings and the sentencing assessment
proceedings. The importance of the common law distinction lends itself to
127.

Ariel Dorfman, The Tyranny of Terror-Is Torture Inevitable in Our Century

and Beyond?, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 3, 8 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). This essay is a
revised version of a keynote speech delivered on June 25, 2002, at a conference in Washington, D.C., organized by Sister Dianna Ortiz and the Torture Abolition and Survivors Support
Coalition International (TASSC).
128.
John D. Van der Vyver, Torture as a Crime under InternationalLaw, 67 ALB.
L. REv. 427, 458 (2003). But see Wattad, supra note 10, at 1027-30 (arguing that terrorism is
not a crime, but is an aggravating factor in sentencing).

2008]

THE TORTURING DEBATE ON TORTURE

the logic-on which both legal jurisprudences agree-that within the
guilt/innocence proceedings, the trial judge (or the jury in a jury-based system) must consider evidence that solely concerns the criminal commission,
thus avoiding so-called biased evidence. This means that many facts that
are relevant to sentencing-for example, prior convictions, testimony to the
personal circumstances of the offender, testimony to his character, expressions of regret by the offender himself, and other criteria of dangerousness-are considered irrelevant at the stage of determining guilt of the
commission of the crime. 129 This is the promise of the presumption of innocence-understood as a constitutional requirement of the right to a fair trial
or to due process of the law-that a person is innocent until proven guilty.
Within the guilt/innocence proceedings, therefore, the judge may not
be exposed to anything that is extrinsic to the proof of the crime itself; evidence bearing on prior history, war record, and family morality are simply
considered irrelevant at this stage of the trial. At this stage, only elements
bearing on the guilt question are relevant. Such evidence concerns the
wrongdoing committed by the offender, the state of mind in which the
wrongdoing was committed, and the attribution of the wrongdoing to30 the
offender himself. These are the constitutive elements of criminal guilt.'
The trouble is that in civil law systems, judges sitting in criminal cases
are already exposed to biased evidence at an early stage of the criminal
trial. This becomes obvious in light of the method by which such systems
are run. It is the civil judges themselves who interrogate the defendant
about his person, name, residence, occupation, marital status, and prior
criminal record. One may then plausibly wonder how civil judges are not
biased as they have already been exposed to such incriminating materials. It
is believed-without much evidence I dare note-that professional judges
can handle this kind of incriminating material without losing their impartiality. 131 However, I do not understand how a judge can remain so unbiased,
as professional as he may be, while the entire file of the offender (the dossier) has been turned over to him by the civilian-partial investigator.
The dichotomy between the different common law proceedings is important not only in regard to which evidence is submitted when, but is also
significant in regards to the degree of proof required for proving such evidence. While evidence submitted at the guilt/innocence proceeding needs to
be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," the burden is lower at the sentencing stage, namely, "by a preponderance of the evidence."
Allow me now to step back to our torture enigma and argue for the
common law distinction. Bearing these distinctions in mind, it seems that if
129.
130.
131.
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Dorfman and Vyver are right-namely that torture is a crime132-then, it
follows necessarily that in coming to accuse, for instance, an interrogator of
torture activity, the prosecution must bring before the court evidence of
such activity, thus proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the question remains: What is it that the prosecution is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt? Do not these acts-so-described as torture-simply constitute murder, rape, assault, and other violent activities
with which all penal codes of any organized legal system are familiar? I am
of the opinion that the answer is affirmative. To elaborate on this, let us
consider the following examples:
I. Mike is a serial killer; he has been killing innocent people, whom
he picked arbitrarily. This he has been doing in certain ways that
cause serious suffering to his victims prior to their death. For instance, one victim he cut into pieces while she was alive. Another
victim was raped first in front of her son's eyes, and then was
killed in an outrageous manner.
II. John is a well-respected gentleman in the community for being a
very successful public speaker against terrorism. All of a sudden,
John became a widower after his wife was kidnapped and killed
by a terrorist organization. The kidnapping took place at midnight
while John was not at home, and no one but his neighbor, Alexander, witnessed this. The terrorists, having figured that Alexander
saw them that night, threatened to kill him if he revealed their
identity. In the absence of Alexander's cooperation, the police and
the state secret services failed to find out who was behind the
crimes and decided to suspend the investigation, but John sought
revenge. He kidnapped Alexander, locked him in the basement of
his house in the dark, seated him on a small chair, and kept him
awake day and night. Every time Alexander fell into a sleep, John
awakened him by tossing freezing water on his face. John did all
this in order to elicit information about the terrorists' identities.
II. Edward's daughter Jane is not an easy child; she brings her parents
many troubles. One time it was just too much for her parents, for
she kept yelling for no reason, and every time she was asked by
her parents about the reason, her screaming became louder. As a
matter of "educational punishment," her parents decided to lock
Jane inside her room for the entire day, but even that did not help.
Then it was the idea of her mother, Marta, that they must not just
lock Jane inside the room, but also must subject her to intensely
loud noises. After ten hours of such intense noises, her parents realized that Jane had fainted. Upon hospitalizing her, her parents
132.
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were told that their daughter now suffers from a serious mental
disability caused by the extremely loud noises to which she was
subjected.
IV. George is a serial killer who kills innocent people just for pleasure; he enjoys seeing dead bodies. After committing his crimes, he
takes pictures of the dead bodies and posts them inside his private
"bloody album."
V. Daniel is a special agent of the state secret service who likes to
adhere to violence, not as a matter of belief that this is the only effective interrogation method to confront terrorism, but rather because he enjoys subjecting his suspects to pain and suffering. In
doing so, he simply feels satisfied and happy.
These five examples involve torture as conceptually understood. However, it is plausible that Mike, John, Edward, Marta, and George will not be
prosecuted for torture. At worst, George will be accused of murder; Mike of
murder, rape, and assault; John of kidnapping, assault, and abuse; and Edward and Marta will be accused of assault and of abuse of a helpless minor.
Note that examples I, II, III, and IV, substantively speaking, constitute tor33
ture even according to, for example, the Convention Against Torture.
However, the Convention Against Torture does not apply to them because
the actors (torturers) are not state agents, but rather are private persons.
Unlike those four examples, the case is slightly different when it
comes to example V. Intuitively, the circumstances surrounding example V
lead us to think first about torture. Again, conceptually speaking, example
V represents a classic case of torture. However, it is not clear whether
Daniel has committed torture in accordance with the definition provided by
the Convention Against Torture. The Convention's definition does not provide a conclusive list of purposes for torture activity; 134 however, the listed
purposes are common in nature. Namely, if by means of interpretation we
seek to extend the Convention's definition to new unlisted purposes, then
these new purposes should be of the same nature as the purposes already
listed. The proof is the Convention's words "for such."' 35 So what is this
nature to which I am referring? I doubt if one can point out what this nature
must be, but one certainly can tell what this nature should not be; namely,
general or abstract purposes do not fit here. The listed purposes are concerned with obtaining information or confessions, punishing, intimidating,
and coercing.' 36 It is true that the Convention provides a large loophole for
recognizing more purposes as it says, "or for any reason based on discrimi133.
134.
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nation of any kind."' 137 Yet, the purposes that could be recognized in accor' 38
dance with this provision must be based on "discrimination of any kind."'
That is to say, it is very likely that a torturer who does so, solely for the
purpose of pleasure, might not be condemned under the Convention
Against Torture even if all the other conditions are met.
If this is true, was it then really torture that American service members
committed against Abu Ghraib prisoners whom they coerced to assume
certain humiliating poses while naked? According to the Convention's
definition, the answer might be negative. This case does not even come
close to Daniel's example, for the latter involves severe pain and suffering
while the former involves, at best, some kind of humiliation and a low degree of suffering. Note that the Convention's definition is concerned only
with severe pain and suffering.1 39 So, what stood behind the harsh criticism
to which American soldiers who participated in the Abu Ghraib abuse were
subject!? The answer, I believe, is to be found in the five conceptual distinctions I suggested in Part IV.
Let me now turn back to Mike, John, Edward, Marta, and George from
examples I, II, I1, and IV. Did they commit torture in accordance with my
suggested conceptual understanding of torture? Yes, they did. However,
even if any penal code includes an independent crime called torture, would
they ever be prosecuted for torture? No. Why is that? Because the only scenario that we have in mind when we speak of torture is that of an evil state
agent (torturer), locking a cuffed suspect in an interrogation room, deep in a
dark basement while a single light is swaying above his head, and subjecting the suspect to extreme and severe pain and suffering. Should that be the
only scenario? Of course the answer is no. To this extent, although Mike,
John, Edward, Marta, and George have committed torture, no one would
expect that they would be prosecuted for torture, but rather for crimes such
as murder, assault, rape, and/or abuse.
We have come to conclude then that for torture to be identified, the nature of the actor-whether private or state agent-is irrelevant. In addition,
the purpose for which torture is committed is also irrelevant. What is relevant is the phenomenon. These are the core components of the phenomenon, those that I have previously expressed through the five conceptual
distinctions which characterize our conceptual understanding of the torture
phenomenon.
But the question remains: How does the conceptual understanding of
torture come into play in the criminal context? Namely, how ought the tor-
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ture committed, not only by Mike, John, Edward, Marta, and George, but
also by Daniel, be reflected in a criminal trial if they are prosecuted?
Like terrorism, torture expresses the overriding motivation that the torturer holds in the course of creating the circumstances, which lead any observer to conceptually perceive that a situation of torture is taking place. In
the context of criminal law, this overriding motivation-as ought to be understood in light of the five conceptual distinctions-constitutes a ground
for enhancing the sentence given upon establishment of criminal guilt. That
is, Mike, John, Edward, Marta, George, and Daniel should be prosecuted
for regular violent crimes, such as assault, mayhem, abuse, rape, and murder. Torture is not a separate crime. Simply stated again, torture involves
nothing but the crimes against the body with which we are already familiar.
However, these crimes against the body, in the context of torture, are accompanied by an overriding motivation, which is reflected through the five
conceptual distinctions. This overriding motivation constitutes an aggravating factor that should enhance the criminal penalty.
Bearing in mind the dichotomy between the guilt/innocence proceeding and the sentencing stage in common law criminal cases, the question
now becomes whether the overriding motivation that is captured by the
torture phenomenon is an aggravating factor that must be proved before the
trial judge (or the jury in a jury-based system) beyond a reasonable doubt,
or be left for the sentencing stage to be thereby proved by a preponderance
of the evidence?
In my book The Meaning of Criminal Law, 14° I have expressed the
view that aggravating elements address a foundational distinction of the
substantive criminal law between guilt and dangerousness. Guilt bears upon
a determination in the past. Dangerousness addresses the future. Guilt is a
determination of a prior wrongdoing, an action that has been accomplished
(ex post facto). Dangerousness is a speculative future determination that
bears upon "something that might reoccur" (ex ante). Guilt targets the internal premises of the criminal action, namely, the interplay between the
offender and the community, and therefore, it is for the community to determine the offender's guilt. On the contrary, dangerousness is an outside
institution; it does not exist between the community and the offender, but
between the offender and the judicial system that is responsible for the adminstration of criminal justice. Therefore, it is for the trial judge to adjudicate the dangerousness question. Finally, while guilt is a notion of fair condemnation, dangerousness is a concept of fair warrant and "notice."
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Again, in a criminal law system of the common law, which purports to
avoid biased convictions, this distinction is of the utmost importance. 141
The question then is: Does torture, as an overriding motivation, bear upon
the guilt question or upon the offender's dangerousness?
During the guilt/innocence proceeding, the prosecution seeks to prove
the offender's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I am of the view that "guilt"
is a unique feature of criminal law. Criminal law can punish only "guilty"
people, for only a guilty person could generate a unifying perspective on
criminal liability. 142 "Guilt" is the barometer for community condemnation
and denunciation. 143 Therefore, guilt is required in order to measure the
severity of the condemnation that the community ought to direct toward the
criminal upon violating norms of correct conduct (wrongdoing). Ignoring
such a measure would render criminal condemnation arbitrary, thus violating the criminal's right to due process of law. Treating all criminal defendants equally, regardless of the degree of wrongdoing that they have committed, shows a clear ignorance of the human capacity to make a rational
choice. This is treating the criminal as an object, humiliating him, and accordingly, infringing on his right to dignity. 144
The overriding motivation that torturers have in"committing their
crimes constitutes the degree of concrete dangerousness of domestic crimes
against the body. This is the kind of dangerousness that distinguishes the
common commission of, for example, murder, and murder as an act of terror; or which distinguishes the commission of "assault," and "assault causing bodily harm." As such, torture is not a new crime. The aforementioned
"overriding motivation" does not even bear upon the so-called guilt-constitutive elements, but rather on the degree of the danger that torturers demonstrate against the community as such, and the specific victim in particular.
For this reason, the overriding motivation should not be confused with mens
rea elements, which do bear on the constitutive elements of guilt. The dangerousness of torturers might be taken into account in imposing criminal
punishment, and be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, but this
may not happen until they have been proven guilty of145the commission of
common crimes of violence beyond a reasonable doubt.
My basic claim then is that torturers are not more culpable or guilty of
their offenses because they are torturers, but that they are more dangerous,
and that is a factor to be considered in sentencing. Having said this, it must be
clarified that while terrorists are dangerous because they perceive themselves
141.
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as guiltless, as doing the right and proper thing, as acting out of the law, and
are thus proud of their actions, torturers are dangerous because they are led by
an overriding motivation to accomplish their ends whatever the means. Although torturers might think that they are not guilty, they are of the belief that
they are acting out of the law, or alternatively, acting within the law but
breaching it for good reasons that might provide certain justifications or give
them some excuses for their actions.
Now that I have provided my argument and explained and elaborated
on it, I shall now put straightforwardly what I could have contended in the
beginning. My ultimate argument stands in contrast with article 4 of the
Convention Against Torture, which requires that all state parties make torture an aggravating crime at the domestic level. 146 Yet, the Convention also
suggests that torture constitutes an aggravating factor, thus enhancing the
penalty for those who are found guilty of committing torture. 147 However,
the Convention does not tell us much about whether such aggravating factors bear on the constitutive elements of the crime required to be proved
within the guilt/innocent proceeding, or simply on the dangerousness of the
criminal, and therefore, could be sufficiently proved by a preponderance of
the evidence at the sentencing stage. I believe that such a classification
must be articulated by the judiciary in accordance with the fundamental
principles148of criminal law theory upon which I have elaborated at length in
this part.
VI.

THE MARCH OF FOLLY: REFUTING/UPHOLDING TABOOS ON
TORTURE

Speaking of the nature and ambit of the prohibition on torture, it has
been repeatedly contended that torture shall not be justified, nor shall it be
excused; the prohibition on torture is absolute. The absolute nature of the
prohibition on torture has become a maxim and a taboo under international
law. The idea is that torture constitutes a forthright
form of barbarism,
149
which should have no place in a civilized society.
A.

THE TICKING-BOMB ENIGMA

The years following the tragedy of 9/11 revived an old discussion regarding the possible justifications for torture, especially under the overwhelming circumstances as described by the oft-cited ticking-bomb sce146.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 25.
147.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 25.
148.
See also Wattad, supra note 42, at 544-45.
149.
See, e.g., William Satire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N. Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15,
2001, at A31.
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nario, whereby a suspect, believed to have planted a time bomb or who
knows about a planted time bomb, which if not defused, will kill many innocent people. 150
The problem is that the ticking-bomb scenario suffers from acute conceptual, practical, and theoretical problems.'15 Frankly, this issue has been
the subject of a comprehensive body of scholarly writing. Therefore, I will
only point out, in a nutshell, my questions about the possible deficiencies of
the ticking-bomb scenario.
Which cases are covered by the ticking-bomb exception? Should the
ticking-bomb exception apply only in cases where many innocents are very
likely to be killed? How many innocents are needed at the level that triggers
the invoking of the ticking-bomb exception? If there is such a fixed number
of innocents, then who has the legal and moral authority to make such a
determination? Besides that, does human dignity-on which the prohibition
against torture stands'152-allow,
in the first place, for such a utilitarian cost53
benefit analysis approach?
Furthermore, if the ticking-bomb scenario illustrates that which is imminent, then who can guarantee that torture leads to eliciting the truth regarding the place of the ticking bomb? Logically, especially in the case of
dealing with terrorists who are keen on achieving their goals, it is very
likely that terrorists will give their interrogator false information to gain
more time for the bomb to explode. Once this happens, obviously there is
no justification for torturing the terrorist, and the only option available
would be prosecuting him for his terrorist activity.
In addition, the scenario with which we are dealing is not as sharp and
clear as it is voiced by those who advocate it as an exception to the absolute
prohibition on torture. Clearly, there is a certain chain of command to
whose attention the facts regarding the planted time bomb must first be
brought, and the latter should then move forward to gather information,
locate the suspects, arrest them, and interrogate those who really have
knowledge of the planted time bomb. It becomes clear now that we are
dealing with a very long process, and it is not as imminent as it is so described.
These wonders and questions lead us to think of the ticking-bomb scenario not only as a hypothesis, but primarily as a forced, demagogical scenario that purports to create fear and instability in the public opinion, and
150. See Luban, supra note 99, at 1440-45.
151.
David Luban argues that the ticking-bomb stories amount to intellectual fraud.
See Luban, supra note 99, at 1427.
152.
See Convention Against Torture, supra note 25, preamble; see also Declaration
on Torture, supra note 23, art. 2.
153.
E.g., BverfG, Feb. 15, 2006, docket number 1 BvR 357/05, available at
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215_lbvr35705en.html.
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thus to urge the adherence to torture activity. In this regard, I must note that
there could be many possible efficient methods with which to confront terrorism, yet not every efficient method is a legal one, and not every legal one
is constitutional. We, as an international community, are thus distinguished
from terrorists and evil persons in that we are a civilized and organized
society-we are not barbarians.
To end up on this note, the wonders and questions I have raised
against the ticking-bomb scenario are widely branded the "slippery slope"
argument. To elaborate on the "slippery slope" argument, without further
explanation, it is worth addressing that which Alan Dershowitz has recently
suggested in his book, Why Terrorism Works. In Dershowitz's view, torture
may be a morally and constitutionally acceptable method for interrogators
to extract information from terrorists when the information may lead to the
immediate saving of lives.1 54 Obviously, Dershowitz bears in mind forms of
nonlethal torture, 155 which should be regulated
by explicit, judicial authori1 56
zation, namely, "judicial torture warrants."
If torturers are so afraid of the mark of Cain, and thus so persistent in
pursuing justification for their actions, then I do not see how Dershowitz is
so keen on denoting this shameful mark on the judiciary. The House of
Lords once rejected the permissibility of evidence obtained by means of
torture, even if obtained outside the land of Great Britain, in order to protect
and preserve the integrity of the court, thus holding that it is a bedrockmoral principle that torture is unacceptable.1 57 Cherif Bassiouni has voiced
his opinion that "the difference between a great nation and a mighty nation
is not measured by its military wherewithal, or its ability to exercise force,
but by its adherence to higher values and principles of law. 15 8
B.

ON THE UNJUSTIFIABLE NATURE OF TORTURE

With this, it has been said that the question remains: Why is the prohibition on torture so absolute? That is, why can torture not be justified? Obviously, article 2(2) of the Convention Against Torture and article 3 of the
Declaration on Torture leave no doubt that even public emergency may not

154.

See DERSHowrrz, supra note 3, at 148.
155.
For example, inserting sterilized needles under the fingernails to produce unbearable pain without any threat to health or life.
156.
DERSHOWrZ, supra note 3, at 141.
157.
See A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2005] UKHL 71 (U.K.); see also
Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, "Did God say, 'You shall not eat of any tree of the garden'?": Rethinking the "Fruits of the Poisonous Tree" in Israeli Constitutional Law, 5
OxFORD U. COMp. L.F. (2005), http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/wattad.shtml.
158.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 125, at 260.
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justify the use of force. 159 Note only that Francis Lieber, in 1863, prohibited
torture even in the state of military necessity. 16° To this extent, these inter16
national documents stand as a symbol of the triumph of human rights.'
Intuition resonates that the absolute nature of the prohibition on torture
emerges from the kind of disgust, humiliation, and derogation that torture
activity involves and generates. But, intuition is not enough, reasoning is
required. Such reasoning lends itself to the basic identity of the phenomenon of torture.
I have argued that the fact that we have entitled the phenomenon of
"torture" a "crime" does not mean that this phenomenon is an independent
crime. It has been my assertion that the kind of illegal conduct of which
"torture" consists is nothing but that with which we are familiar in regards
to other domestic crimes of violence against the body. To this extent, torture is not so different from murder, rape, assault, theft, arson, and burglary.
They are all illegal types of conduct which are absolutely prohibited.
When I argue that murder, for instance, is not permissible under any
circumstances, I am well aware of the counterargument whereby one may
wonder: What about self-defense? Well, it is very important to understand
that self-defense is not a license to commit murder. Rather, self-defense is a
legal license to avert an imminent threat of aggression in a proportionate
manner when necessary, and which might lead, in certain cases, to the death
of the aggressor. However, causing the death of the aggressor is not the
same as killing a person. While the latter case requires the intent to kill a
human being in the absence
of provocation, the former consists of the intent
62
to avert an aggression.'
Here we are then: self-defense might cause the death of the aggressor,
but in the absence of the intent to kill, the crime of murder does not come
into play. It is impossible for a person to invoke the defense of self-defense
against an accusation of the crime of rape, for example. Why is that? Because in the rape crime, for the actor, namely, the criminal, to be found
guilty of such a crime, it must be first proved that he had the intention to
159.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 25, art. 2; see also Declaration on Torture, supra note 23, art. 2.

160. U.S. War Dep't Gen. Order No. 100 (1863), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CoNFLICTs: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3

(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988) (1973). It is notable that the Lieber Code was originally binding only on the American forces; however, to a
great extent, it contributed to the customs of war existing at that time.
161.
See Oona A. Hathaway, The Promise and Limits of the International Law of
Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 199, 199 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
162.
See GEORGE FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL
CONTEXT: THE BASICS 581-83 (2005); see also FLETCHER, supra note 35, at 76; WATrAD,
supra note 6, at 532-33. For a general overview of the right to self-defense, see GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1998).
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have intercourse against the victim's will. 63 Such intention, if established,
has nothing to do with an intention to avert an aggression available within
the self-defense scenario, The same is the case for torture. It is impossible
for an interrogator to argue that he caused the torture of the suspect in the
course of his efforts to avert an imminent threat of aggression.
Self-defense is about the wrongdoing and not about the aggressor. It is
about the danger, but not about the dangerous person, which means that
once the aggression is seized, the force used for averting the aggression
must be seized as well.164 Like rape, torture requires not only the regular
intent with which other crimes of violence against the body involve, but it
also requires, among other things, the intention of creating the terrifying
atmosphere as demonstrated by the five conceptual distinctions, which is
associated, in this context, with the commission of regular crimes of violence against the person/body. 165 While obviously we can think of many
cases whereby intending to avert an aggression, the death of the aggressor
might occur, I can think of no single instance whereby attempting to avert
an aggression, the rape of the aggressor occurs or the torture of the aggressor (e.g., the terrorist) will incidentally happen.166 This is then, why torture
is absolutely prohibited, but this is also why it cannot be justified.
C.

"NECESSITY" FOR THE STATE-IS IT POSSIBLE?

Having argued so, the question remains one of necessity. In the oftdiscussed example of an interrogation directed by the secret service of a
particular legal system, can the interrogators invoke the defense of necessity for practicing torture? It is true that criminal law theory distinguishes
between two kinds of necessity: excused necessity (personal necessity) and
justified necessity (lesser-evil doctrine). 167 However, before examining
these two kinds of necessity, the distinction
between justification defenses
168
and excusing defenses must be clarified.
163.
FLETCHER, supra note 126, at 701; see also Regina v. Morgan, [1975] 2 W.L.R.
923 (Can.).
164.

GEORGE FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT:

THE BASICS 532-33 (2005).

165.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text (outlining the five conceptual distinctions).
166.
The same rationale applies to theft, robbery, and fraud. These harmful consequences do not occur by chance; rather, they are well connected to the intention of the actor
to bring about their occurrence. See Fletcher, supra note 35, at 62.
167.
See Khalid Ghanayim, Necessity in Western Legal Philosophy, 19 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 31 (2006).

168.

For general study on this issue, see Albin Eser, Justification and Excuse: A Key

Issue in the Concept of Crime, in 1 JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

17 (Albin Eser & George Fletcher eds., 1987), and Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Bor-
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Claims of justification concede that the definition of the offense is satisfied, but challenge whether the act is wrongful; claims of excuse concede
that the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid the attribution of the act to the
actor. Justifications speak to the rightness of the act. Justifications include
"consent, lesser evils, self-defense, defense of others, defense of property
and habitation, self-help in recapturing chattels, the use of force in effecting
arrests and executing legal judgments, as well as superior order."' 69 To understand the theory of justification, one may consider the paradigmatic example of self-defense. A, an aggressor, threatens to attack B. B is not required to wait until A attacks him; it is B's right to act, namely, to respond
to A's imminent threat to the extent this is required in order to repel A's
attack. B's action satisfies the elements of the crime of assault. 170 However,
the fact that B acted under the theory of self-defense negates the wrongdoMoreover, justifications
ing embodied in his action (zero wrongdoing).
17 1
express the idea that B has done the right thing.
Excuses concern the actor's accountability for a concededly wrongful
act.172 Interposing a claim of excuse concedes that there is a wrong to be
excused. The claim challenges the attribution of the wrongdoing to the actor.
If the excuse is valid, then, as a matter of definition, the actor is not accountable or culpable for the wrongful act. The
focus of the excuse is not on the act in the abstract, but on
the circumstances of the act and the actor's personal capacan intentional wrong or the taking of an
ity to avoid either
73
excessive risk.1
Insanity, involuntary intoxication, necessity, and duress are classic examples of the concept of excuses. They express compassion. The assumption
is that there are certain situations in life in which people have no choice but
to engage in harmful and unjust actions-as George Fletcher puts it: "Their
back is to the wall."' 174 These are situations where people are caught in
overwhelming circumstances. They must, therefore, break rules of criminal
law (e.g., kill or steal) in order to survive. However, "these actions are unders of Justification and Excuse, in 1 JUSTIFICATION AND ExCUSE: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 263,263 (Albin Eser & George Fletcher eds., 1987).
169.
FLETCHER, supra note 126, at 769.
170. Wattad, supra note 8, at 214-15.
171.
Justifications indicate that the act is acceptable in the eyes of society, and that
doing it is both correct and desirable. The public is encouraged to perform like acts. See
Wattad, supra note 8.
172.
FLETCHER, supra note 126, at 759.
173.
FLETCHER, supra note 126, at 789-99.
174.
FLETCHER, supra note 35, at 130-31.
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on innocent people, people who are not wrongful
just for they entail attacks
1 75
themselves."
aggressors
It should be clear by now that interrogators may not invoke the defense of personal necessity. Only those who are subject to the imminent
danger (the overwhelming circumstances) are allowed to act against the
terrorists as a matter of necessity, and thus be excused. A third party, whatever his position might be (e.g., security guard, police officer, or interrogator), may not assert the necessity defense and seek to be excused from
criminal liability. In addition, it may also be noted that only people can be
excused, mainly because excuses focus on the actor's personal capacity to
avoid either an intentional wrong, or the taking of an excessive risk. Therefore, state agents acting within their official capacity represent the state, and
the state may never be excused. Moreover, the state is supposed to act only
lawfully, for when it acts unlawfully it undermines the legal grounds upon
which it stands.
By eliminating all these options, we have remained with the possibility
of justified necessity, namely, with the lesser-evil doctrine. However, the
applicability of this defense, in regard to torturers, is very problematic for
several reasons. First, the nature of justifications is to negate the wrongdoing otherwise embodied in the wrongful action. Torturers intend to commit
an act of torture, as I have conceptually defined it, and like rape, their attempts to avert any terrorist aggression against innocent people do not result in torturing the suspect unless there is such an intention to do so
(namely, the intention of creating the terrifying atmosphere, as demonstrated by the five conceptual distinctions, which is associated, in this context, with the commission of regular crimes of violence against the person/body). In the existence of such an intention, we are dealing with a clear
case of prohibited torture, for the wrongdoing element was not negated. In
any case, it cannot be the message that a civilized and organized legal system seeks to convey to the public that torture is right.
Second, justified necessity is largely invoked when a life may be
spared at the expense of property damage; namely, damaging property in
order to save a human life is a justified act by reason of justified necessity.
Such is the case when A breaks into B's shop seeking to get a fire extinguisher in order to put out the fire that has engulfed C's car, and thereby, to
save the life of C's child who is locked inside the vehicle.

175.

FLETCHER, supra note 35, at 131. When the conduct is merely excused, the

implication is that the act is both antisocial and prohibited. Society refrains from imposing
criminal punishment in recognition of the actor's dire circumstances-the acquittal is not an
expression of the conduct's acceptability. Therefore, reinforcing public faith in respecting

social values and criminal norms requires that we clearly distinguish among the various
defenses to criminal liability.
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Obviously, any legal system that grants a place of honor to human
dignity shall not make it possible to invoke the defense of justified necessity in cases where one person seeks to save his own life, or the life of others (as many as they may be), by risking the life of another person, or other
people. My assumption is that no life is worth more than another; the lives
of all persons are equal. Frankly, scholars of utilitarian orientation will not
agree with my approach; they might even strongly criticize me. However, if
I desert my approach, I can easily anticipate that the biblical dilemmas on
saving lives will shortly become true. For example, assuming that I agree
that it should be justified conduct to save the lives of one hundred persons
by risking the life of one person, the question then becomes: should it be
justified to save the lives of seventy people by risking the lives of thirty
others? What about risking176the lives of fifty-one people in order to save the
lives of forty-nine others?
Let us make the case even harder. Assume that the defense of justified
necessity would not be possible in cases where at stake are the lives of two
ordinary people; would it be available when at stake is the life of a Prime
Minister, a President, a King, or an Emperor against the life of an ordinary
person? Whose life is worth more? If this sounds like an easy enigma, then
what about saving the life of a President by risking the lives of one hundred
ordinary people, one thousand people, or one million people? Whose life is
worth more? What are the moral grounds for evaluating one's life as worth
more than others? Who decides? Where are the limits? These are very complicated questions that I doubt should be resolved by simply adhering to the
doctrine of "lesser evils."
D.

MERCY BY THE "QUEEN" -SOLVING

THE PUZZLE

In reality, the question of evaluating one person's life against another's
has appeared more than once before judicial tribunals. I shall consider a
leading and oft-cited case in this regard. Henceforth, I will call it the "cannibalism case."
Dudley, Stephens, Brooks, and Parker were cast away in a storm while
on an English yacht. The yacht was damaged by the storm, forcing the four
men to abandon it and escape in an open boat, which belonged to the yacht.
They had no supply of food except for two tins of turnips. On the fourth
day, they were able to catch a small turtle, which they had completely consumed by the twelfth day. After twenty days, being over one thousand miles
from land, Stephens and Dudley decided, without the consent of Brooks,
that they would kill and eat Parker. Parker was the youngest and weakest of
176.
See BverfG, Feb. 15, 2006, docket number 1 BvR 357/05, available at
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215_lbvrO35705en.html.
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them all. Dudley offered a prayer for forgiveness and then put a knife to
Parker's throat and killed him. Dudley, Stephens, and Brooks all fed upon
Parker's body for four days, and shortly after that, they were rescued, but
they were not in good health. It was clear that if the three remaining men
had not fed upon Parker's body, they probably would have died of famine
before they were eventually rescued. It was also clear that Parker would
likely have died before all the others because he was in a much weaker
state. Upon returning to land, Dudley and Stephens were arrested and
brought to trial.
The court found them guilty of murder. In its reasoning, the court held
that where a private person, acting on his own judgment, takes the life of
another, he is guilty of murder, unless his act can be justified by selfdefense, which was not the case here for Parker neither attacked nor threatened to attack Dudley and Stephens. It is notable that the court was well
aware of the overwhelming circumstances upon which both Dudley and
Stephens acted. The court made it clear that while it may have been necessary to kill Parker for their survival, it was not an excusable or justifiable
killing. Yet, although the court deemed the acts of the defendants to be
murder, it did not deem them to be evil. Upon finding Dudley and Stephens
177
guilty of murder, the court imposed the sentence of death upon them.
Later on, the Crown accepted the arguments for compassion and reduced
their sentence to six months imprisonment.178
The reason I am raising this case here is that there are cases where our
intuition as human beings leads us to demonstrate some kind of compassion
towards certain situations, even though we are very decisive regarding their
wrongfulness. It is not an impossible scenario that an interrogator saves the
lives of thousands of innocent people by torturing one person suspected of
terrorist activity. Imagine that the British secret services had been able to
catch a Nazi leader, torture him, and reveal the Nazi conspiracies of the
Holocaust, for example. By this, the lives of millions of Jews would have
been saved. Then, it would be clear that the British interrogators committed
something wrong for which they should be responsible and found guilty.
Yet, some kind of compassion toward the whole situation becomes intuitive
(though not toward the wrongdoing they committed). Formally speaking, if
these interrogators were prosecuted, they would, and they should, be found
guilty for this wrongdoing, and punishment must be imposed on them accordingly-exactly as was the situation in the cannibalism case. So, how
ought this "sense of compassion" be expressed in a proper and legal manner?

177.
178.

Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (U.K.).
See also FLETCHER, supra note 35, at 132.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

The only way to avoid the execution of judgment is by the grant of
pardon/clemency/mercy (ius aggratiandi)by the head of the state, such as a
King, Queen, or President. This solution dates back to the Saxon rule a lege
fuae dignitatis.179 Underlying this solution is the idea that laws cannot be
based on principles of compassion to guilt; yet justice is bound to be administered in mercy, and the latter is within the prerogative of the Crown.' 80 In
administering his prerogative, the Crown may take into account considerations that otherwise may not be admissible in the formal criminal trial. Indeed, such considerations are limited to what is lawful and just in a larger
sense. Of course, the range, ambit, and purpose for which a pardon may be
granted, as well as the object, manner, and method of pardon,
can be sub8
ject to serious dispute, both philosophically and practically.' '
Granting pardon does not mean that the wrongdoing embodied in the
crime at stake was negated, nor does it mean that the criminal is personally
excused and that criminal responsibility should thus not be attributed to
him. Rather, all it means is that a kind of compassion is demonstrated by
society, as represented by the Crown, toward the situation in which the
criminal was involved. Because of its special nature, pardons shall not be
granted on a daily basis, but must be reserved for very rare and unique
situations. As for the punishment, granting a pardon would mean commuting the sentence, lessening, or entirely removing it. Although the Crown has
the ultimate power to grant a pardon, it is still the judiciary that implements
that which the law compels, and therefore, the Crown's power should be
subject to judicial review, though limited only to extreme cases, such as
where the Crown takes into account novel considerations, or the Crown's
decision is extremely and manifestly unreasonable.
Ultimately, as William Blackstone expressed,
[t]he effect of such pardon by the king is to make the offender a new man; to acquit him of all corporal penalties
and forfeitures annexed to that offence for which he obtains
his pardon; and not so much to restore
his former, as to
82
give him a new credit and capacity.'
179.

See 4

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:

PUBLIC WRONGS 389-90 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979) (1765-1769).

180.
Id. at 389.
181.
Id. at 391-95; see also Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, Toward New Theoretical
Perspectives on Forgiveness, Mercy, and Clemency: An Introduction, in FORGIVENESS,
MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 1, 1 (2007).
182.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 179, at 259 (emphasis added); see also IMMANUEL
KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 144 (John Ladd trans., 2d ed. 1999) ("The right

to pardon a criminal [ius aggratiandi],either by mitigating or by entirely remitting the punishment, is certainly the most slippery of all the rights of the sovereign.").
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To conclude on this issue, it is worth clarifying that a pardon is by no
means a criminal defense; at best it is a gesture by the Crown. However,
like criminal defenses, it is characterized by its ex post, but not ex ante,
nature.183 Having said that, it does not constitute an authority to act.' 84 Interrogators do not have the authority to torture suspects based on the possible
future granting of a pardon, nor do they have any assurance (or interest of
reliance under public law) that such a pardon would be granted to them in
any particular case. 185 To this extent, it should be clear that the rule is that
torture is absolutely prohibited, exactly as rape, fraud, and robbery are all
absolutely prohibited. The possibility of granting a pardon to a torturer
would depend on an ad hoc examination of each case independently. There
must be neither a general rule against a pardon, nor a general rule for a pardon in advance.
It must be clear that by engaging in torture activity in given circumstances, interrogators take certain liberties that otherwise they are not entitled to take. As such, they are exposing themselves to the risk of criminal
prosecution exactly as they take the chance of being granted a pardon by
the Crown upon setting out their arguments in seeking compassion thereto.
E.

THE REASONABLE LIMITS OF A CRIMINAL INTERROGATION

At this stage, I would have hastened toward ending my article, concluding therein with all that has been argued, suggested, and reasoned.
However, since torture is very often discussed in the realm of criminal investigation, it is then required that I spend a further discussion on the nature
of criminal investigation, thus understanding not only that which interrogators may not do, but also that which they may do.
The topic of criminal investigation is controlled not only by criminal
law, but also by administrative law. While criminal law is the law of "shall
not do," 18 6 administrative law is driven by certain principles regarding the
range and ambit of administrative authority, which is subject to principles
of reasonableness and proportionality.
Somehow, the accusation of torture activity emerges every time any
kind of violence against suspects is taking place during the interrogation.
Mistakenly, one might get the impression that the Convention Against Torture, or other international documents, proscribe the use of violence during
criminal interrogation. Interrogations, especially if conducted by secret services-in particular in the context of terrorist activity-are not a caf6 meet183.
184.
185.
186.

WATrAD, supra note 6, at 81-82.
See Israeli Case Against Torture, supra note 69, paras. 36-37.
See Israeli Case Against Torture, supra note 69, para. 40.
WATrAD, supra note 6, at 183.
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ing; they consist of inconvenient conditions,18 7 which may obviously include the use of violence. However, the degree and level of this violence
and inconvenience must be reasonable and proportionate, taking into consideration the purpose of the investigation, as well as the balance between
the suspect's rights and the interests protected by the interrogation.
In other words, in conducting their investigation, interrogators must
always adhere to the least coercive means. A degree of violence and discomfort must only be considered when necessary. Even then, they may
inflict violence or discomfort only in a proportionate manner. Bear in mind
that these limits on a criminal interrogation assist us in delineating what is
reasonable and proportionate.
By now, it should be clear that torture, as conceptually defined in this
article, is completely excluded from the ambit of a "reasonable interrogation." To elaborate on our understanding of the nature of a "reasonable interrogation," I shall end this part with Justice Barak's well articulated
words:
Our concern, therefore, lies in the clash of values and the
balancing of conflicting values. The balancing process results in the rules for a "reasonable interrogation." These
rules are based, on the one hand, on preserving the "human
image" of the suspect, and on preserving the "purity of
arms" used during the interrogation. On the other hand,
these rules take into consideration the need to fight crime in
general, and terrorist attacks in particular. These rules reflect "a degree of reasonableness, straight thinking, and
fairness." The rules pertaining to investigations are important to a democratic state. They reflect its character. An illegal investigation harms the 1 suspect's
human dignity. It
88
equally harms society's fabric.
VII.

CONCLUSION

An old English proverb states that "A good beginning, makes a good
ending," which translates in German as "Was gut beginnt, wird gut enden,"
and in French as "Bien commencer, amine t, bien terminer."
I started this article, in Part II, by visiting the basic pillar of the torture
debate-that which concerns the meaning of "torture." By considering existing international documents and other leading cases of international and
national judicial tribunals, I have come to conclude that the existing defini187.
188.

See Israeli Case Against Torture, supra note 69.
See Israeli Case Against Torture, supra note 69, para. 22 (citations omitted).
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tion of torture, as well as the case law in this regard, suffers from serious
conceptual deficiencies, including other problems of coherency and reasoning. It has been my conclusion also that such treatment of the torture phenomenon is politically motivated, and that it suits, at best, what we observe
as torture nowadays. Such understanding does not suit other historical practices of torture, and certainly will not be compatible with future torture
practices. In support of this view, I provided in Part III, in addition to my
reasoning, several perspectives of leading scholars on this jurisprudence.
In Part IV, I offered a conceptual definition of the phenomenon of torture, thus sketching five conceptual distinctions whereupon torture conduct
can be recognized. These five conceptual distinctions treat "the phenomenon of torture" as standing in itself and out of context, which allows this
definition to suit not only current practices of torture, but also historical and
future ones. It has been my suggestion that if conceptually understood, torture is described by highlighting a kind of game of mental resistance between the torturer and the victim, 189 the competition of minds between he
who dominates the situation and he who is dominated, 90 and the emotional
pressure that is imposed on the victim by he who is taking control of the
situation. 19' It has been my view that the torturer is conceptually perceived
as the superior and the active actor who acts in secret with ample confidence, thus imposing fear on his victim and causing him a degree of suffering. On the contrary, the victim of torture is one who is inferior and passive;
he is the "handcuffed," terrified, and suffering character.
Bearing in mind these five conceptual distinctions, in Part V, I turned
to discuss torture in the criminal context. I concluded that the existing understanding of "torture" as a separate crime is simply wrong, for it lacks the
conceptual grounds of substantive criminal law as illustrated in the discussion on crime, guilt, and punishment. I argued that not every phenomenon
that we, as a community, dislike must be articulated automatically as a
separate crime. Instead, we must consider the conceptual distinction between guilt and dangerousness, which relies on the common law practice of
criminal trials, thus separating the guilt/innocence proceeding and the sentencing stage. My view has been that torture does not bear on the constitutive elements of guilt, and that torture involves the classic types of conduct
with which we are familiar in other domestic crimes of violence against the
body or the person. In addition, I concluded Part V by arguing that torture
represents the overriding motivation of the torturers, thus reflecting the
degree of dangerousness upon which they are acting. Such dangerousness is

189.
190.
191.

See Israeli Case Against Torture, supra note 69.
See Israeli Case Against Torture, supra note 69.
See Israeli Case Against Torture, supra note 69.
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a relevant aggravating factor at the sentencing stage, which the prosecution
is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Part VI, I sought to address certain taboos in the torture debate, thus
refuting or upholding them. I started Part VI by strongly criticizing the ticking-bomb scenario, which arguably justifies torture conduct. I argued that
such a scenario is impossible in real life. Furthermore, I explained the absolute nature of the prohibition against torture from a new perspective, noting
that such an absolute feature of the prohibition resembles that of any other
prohibition against murder, rape, assault, and all other criminal prohibitions. I also explained why torturers cannot argue for the case of selfdefense following their engagement in torture activity, elaborating on the
distinction between the intent with which self-defense is concerned, intent
to avert an aggression, and the intent with which torture is concerned,
namely, the intent to create a terrifying atmosphere as demonstrated by the
five conceptual distinctions, which is associated, in this context, with the
commission of regular crimes of violence against the person/body. It has
been my view that while a person may cause the death of an aggressor
without having the intent to kill him, it is impossible to cause the torture of
a person by merely intending to avert an aggression.
Then, I examined the possibility of excluding the criminal responsibility of interrogators by means of justified or excused necessity. In this
course, I concluded that neither defense stands for interrogators, even in
cases where the community is tempted to express sympathy towards the
situation with which they were involved. I supported my arguments by relying on the nature of the well-known distinction in criminal law theory between justifications and excuses.
Having contended so, still, immediately after that, I suggested that
there may be situations where, although interrogators have committed
wrongdoing by engaging in torture conduct, and although they must be
condemned for such wrongdoing, we as a community are very likely to
demonstrate a degree of compassion towards the situation with which they
were confronted. Such compassion can be expressed through the President's or Crown's power to commute, lessen, or entirely remove the sentence. In this way, we still acknowledge the wrongdoing embodied in the
conduct and the condemnation attributed to the torturer, but at the same
time avoid the punishment for good reasons of compassion.
At this stage, I was strongly encouraged to take one further step to explain to interrogators not only that which they must not do, but primarily,
that which they are entitled to do. Specifically, I tried to focus on the administrative limits of a legal criminal interrogation, thus suggesting that any
such limits must be proportionate and reasonable ones.
We can now end where we began, namely, with the conception of human dignity. Recently, it was the German Bundesverfassungsgericht(Fed-
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eral Constitutional Court) that92affirmed and emphasized the absolute nature
of the right to human dignity.'
If I were asked to summarize the nature and the basic character of the
prohibition against torture in two words, it would be "Human Dignity," as
explicitly acknowledged in all relevant international documents.' 93 From a
conceptual point of view, this is where the prohibition against torture draws
its absolute character. As correctly viewed by Immanuel Kant, "[i]n the
kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price
can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand
is raised above all price, and, therefore, admits of no equivalent has a dignity."' 94 If this is true, then obviously torture can never be justified, nor can
it be excused, for no utilitarian considerations can ever be taken into account once human dignity is at stake.
Having put forth my views and arguments directly, I am not na'fve as
to the perplexing nature of reality. Interrogators are not sitting and relaxing
behind a desk, reading novels or academic books and articles on how they
should be conducting their investigations, and even when they do so, it still
might not be clear for them how they should implement the theories of this
jurisprudence. Real life is much more complex than one may describe it in
an article or a book, no matter how well articulated it may be. However, 1as
95
William Bridges once said, "we come to beginnings only at the end."'
Yet, as the American proverb suggests, "from small beginnings come great
things. 196 Ernest Hemingway correctly viewed that "there are some things
which cannot be learned quickly, and time, which is all we have, 197
must be
paid heavily for their acquiring. They are the very simplest things."'
For the honor of man's dignity, and for future generations, may it be a
better future for humanity.
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